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VAWA @ 20: 
THE POLITICS OF PRETEXT: VAWA GOES GLOBAL 
 
Deborah M. Weissman* 
 
The twentieth anniversary of the Violence Against Women Act 
(VAWA) provides an opportunity to assess the meaning and consequences 
of the Act. VAWA and its subsequent Congressional reauthorizations 
represent efforts to protect women from gender-based violence in the realm 
of domestic politics. But with the introduction of a new bill, VAWA 
International (I-VAWA), Congress has signaled its intent to expand U.S. 
influence in the realm of violence against women as a matter of foreign 
policy. First introduced in 2007, and subsequently re-introduced in each 
succeeding session of Congress, I-VAWA seeks to “prevent and respond to 
violence against women and girls around the world, as a matter of basic 
human rights as well as to promote gender equality, economic growth, and 
improved public health.”1 It proposes to “systematically integrate and 
coordinate” foreign policy and foreign aid programs in order to mitigate the 
harm caused by violence against women in the world at large.2 I-VAWA 
creates a new office of Global Women’s Issues within the Department of 
State and establishes the position of Ambassador-at-Large within the U.S. 
Agency for International Aid (USAID) responsible for global assistance 
programs. It derives much of its programmatic initiatives from a 2012 
document created by USAID entitled “United States Strategy to Prevent and 
Respond to Gender-Based Violence Globally” (hereinafter 2012 Strategy) 
which articulates U.S. interests in assuming leadership in efforts to end 
violence against women: promoting global market economies, 
                                                
* Reef C. Ivey II Distinguished Professor of Law, University of North Carolina School 
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1 International Violence Against Women Act of 2013, H.R. 3571, S. 2307, 113th 
Cong. (2013). 
2 Id. 
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strengthening national security and defense, and assuring that such form of 
violence is recognized as a criminal and not cultural act.3 
I-VAWA has been touted for its ambitious and holistic approach to a 
global phenomenon based on a vision of improved status for women and 
gender equality. Amnesty International and other advocacy groups support 
the bill for having proclaimed the end of violence against women and girls 
as a priority of diplomatic and foreign assistance policies.4 
In fact, I-VAWA is not the first such effort. Rather it represents a 
continuation of U.S. efforts to mainstream the protection and advancement 
of women’s rights as a facet of foreign policy initiatives. Prior efforts, 
however, should serve as a cautionary tale: I-VAWA arrives in its current 
form possessed of a history which has often invoked the condition of 
women as pretext for interventionist policies.5 The call to end gender 
violence around the world—a goal that people of good will cannot but be 
sympathetic—is a complex matter, and must be assessed through a 
historical and critical lens. 
Efforts to transplant legal standards from developed countries to less 
developed countries have been the subject of long-standing critique. Indeed, 
such transfers are found to have questionable relevance to recipient 
countries. Legal systems are foundational to the integrity of the nation state 
and cannot obtain legitimacy except through political consensus and 
historical continuities.6 Although there is no one set of best practices to end 
gender-based violence, most U.S. initiatives take the form of unilateral 
directives and treat all women as though they are similarly situated.7 
Many requirements are impractical to implement and ignore mitigating 
circumstances, including local customs and cultural practices. Shelter 
programs, counseling, and the proliferation of criminal sanctions have often 
been rejected as unsuitable for many victims and may interfere with other 
systems that have the potential to provide protection against violence. 
                                                
3 USAID, United States Strategy to Prevent and Respond to Gender-Based Violence 
Globally (2012), http://www.state.gov/documents/organization/196468.pdf.  
4 See Support the International Violence Against Women Act (I-VAWA), AMNESTY 
INT’L, http://www.amnestyusa.org/our-work/issues/women-s-rights/violence-against-
women/international-violence-against-women-act. 
5 See generally Deborah M. Weissman, The Human Rights Dilemma: Rethinking the 
Humanitarian Project, 35 COLUM. HUM. RTS. L. REV. 259 (2004); KRISTIN L. HOGANSON, 
FIGHTING FOR AMERICAN MANHOOD (1998). 
6 See Deborah M. Weissman, Remaking Mexico: Law Reform As Foreign Policy, 35 
CARDOZO L. REV. 1471, 1495 (2104). 
7 Id.; see also Leigh Goodmark, Exporting Without License: The American Attempt to 
End Intimate Partner Abuse Worldwide, COMPARATIVE PERSPECTIVES ON DOMESTIC 
VIOLENCE: LESSONS FROM EFFORTS WORLDWIDE (Rashmi Goel & Leigh Goodmark, eds. 
Oxford University Press, publication forthcoming 2015). 
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This essay contributes to the critical analysis by considering concerns 
specific to I-VAWA. First, it critiques the role of USAID as the principal 
implementing agency. Next, it assesses those provisions of the bill that 
impose policies and practices abroad that are not observed at home. To 
make the larger point: the United States is neither capable nor deserving of 
its self-appointed global leadership on the issue of violence against women. 
USAID was established through the Foreign Assistance Act of 1961 to 
“strengthen friendly foreign countries by encouraging the development of 
their free economic institutions, productive capabilities, and by eliminating 
barriers to the flow of private investment capital.”8 In addition to promoting 
“free market economies,” USAID has worked to advance other foreign 
policy objectives related to national security, military intervention, and 
geopolitical interests.9 USAID has engaged in covert operations, 
particularly in Latin America; its employees have been expelled for efforts 
at subverting governments out of favor with the United States.10 The agency 
works primarily through U.S.-based firms with which it contracts through 
no-bid processes that lack transparency and often cost more than if the tasks 
had been allocated to local agents in the countries where they establish aid 
programs.11 
I-VAWA is not USAID’s first foray into directing assistance programs 
targeting women. USAID has focused on women in development and has 
asserted that its programs promote gender equality. However, USAID has 
been criticized for promoting women’s economic endeavors in ways 
consistent with U.S. neoliberal economic needs rather than supporting 
fundamental structural change and improvement in the lives of most 
women.12 It has pursued “family planning” initiatives in poor countries by 
funding and promoting birth control methods described as racialized 
interventions through coercive and duplicitous means.13 It has required 
foreign recipients of USAID funds to agree not to provide abortions, refer 
clients to abortion services, or seek to liberalize abortion laws with any 
                                                
8 H.R. REP. No 87-1088, Sec. 102 (1961) (Conf. Rep.), available at 
http://www.cgdev.org/doc/Rethinking%20Aid/foreign_assistance_act_of_1961.pdf. 
9 See Weissman, supra note 6, at 1489-91 (reviewing U.S. aid initiatives in Latin 
America). 
10 See, e.g., William Neuman, U.S. Agency is Expelled from Bolivia, N.Y. TIMES, May 
2, 2013, at A8. 
11 See Roger Bate, The Trouble With USAID, AEI (May 24, 2006), 
http://www.aei.org/article/health/the-trouble-with-usaid/. 
12 Jane L. Parpart, Who is the ‘Other’?: A Postmodern Feminist Critique of Women 
and Development Theory and Practice, 24 DEVELOPMENT AND CHANGE 439, 449 (1993). 
13 See Kalpana Wilson, RACE, RACISM, AND DEVELOPMENT 84-85 (2012) (describing 
the relationship between U.S. global population control efforts and U.S. corporate capital). 
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funds including non-USAID resources.14 It has compelled recipients to 
adopt policies opposing sex work, notwithstanding evidence that sex 
workers are central to efforts to prevent HIV.15 Moreover, USAID has 
misappropriated the skills and co-opted the resources of local/foreign NGOs 
with whom it partners. In Iraq, for example, USAID declared that local 
women’s NGOs were a part of the U.S. “combat team” and an arm of the 
U.S. government, thus requiring such groups to align themselves with U.S. 
national security policies rather than the needs of the constituent 
population.16 As a result, as one researcher has written, “[l]ocal people 
trained in the servicing of the aid industry have been rendered unsuitable to 
work for their own governments.”17 
I-VAWA’s provisions act to exacerbate these problems. Politicians 
justify support for the Act as a means to minimize the opportunity for 
terrorist “breeding grounds.”18 Indeed, the 2012 Strategy document is 
embedded in U.S. national security strategy. Specific provisions of 
I-VAWA promote enhanced militarization as an approach to ending 
violence against women.19 The 2012 Strategy document emphasizes 
criminalization initiatives as the principal feature of legal reform, 
notwithstanding the well-documented failures of the U.S. criminal justice 
system to respond to women, particularly poor women and women of 
color.20 Policy decisions are crafted in Washington, presumptively the 
center of “expertise and capacity to prevent and respond to gender-based 
violence globally.”21 I-VAWA requires the implementation of programs in 
low-income countries, and continues the practice of treating poor women 
and poor countries as without capacity.22 No less troubling, the U.S. 
government will monitor the performance of recipients, and thus intervene 
in local and state governance issues in problematic ways. 
                                                
14 Global Gag Rule, POPULATION ACTION INT’L (Dec. 5, 2014), 
http://populationaction.org/topics/global-gag-rule/. The Rule has been imposed and 
rescinded a number of times and its future dependent on U.S. presidential politics. 
15 See Aziza Ahmed, Feminism, Power, and Sex Work in the Context of HIV/AIDS:  
Consequences for Women’s Health, 34 HARV. J.L. & GENDER 225, 249 (2011). 
16 HAIFA ZANGANA, CITY OF WINDOWS: AN IRAQI WOMAN’S ACCOUNT OF WAR AND 
RESISTANCE 82 (2007). 
17 Ruth Mandel, Seeding Civil Society, in POSTSOCIALISM: IDEALS, IDEOLOGIES AND 
PRACTICES IN EURASIA 279, 287 (C.M. 40anne d., 2002). 
18 Members of House and Senate Stand in Support of Landmark Legislation to Combat 
Violence Against Women, TOM HARKIN (Feb. 4, 2010), http://www.harkin.senate.gov/ 
press/release.cfm?i=322101. 
19 H.R. 3571, 113th Cong. § 3(7); S. 2307 113th § 3(7). 
20 See 2012 Strategy Document, supra note 3, at 26 (four of the five recommendations 
for legal reform pertains to the criminal justice system). 
21 Id. at 14. 
22 H.R. 3571, 113th Cong. § 111(e); S. 2307 113th § 111(e). 
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I-VAWA and the 2012 Strategy are informed with the premise that the 
United States is uniquely situated to provide global leadership on the issue 
on violence against women. In fact, the United States is an exceptional 
outlier on the very issues about which it claims moral authority. On gender 
matters generally, the United States is one of a few countries that has failed 
to ratify the international Convention to End Discrimination Against 
Women and the Inter-American Convention on the Prevention, Punishment 
and Eradication of Violence Against Women. While I-VAWA promises to 
disrupt the relationship between poverty and gender violence, Washington 
has failed to ratify the Covenant on Economic, Social, and Cultural Rights 
which specifies the obligations of state parties to attend to such issues, 
particularly for poor women. Nor does the U.S. Constitution provide for 
economic rights or embrace equality for women. A comparison of U.S. 
court decisions with decisions from the European Court of Human Rights 
demonstrates the way in which U.S. law falls short of protecting women 
from violence.23 I-VAWA further pledges attention to the needs of persons 
with disabilities and refugees although the United States has declined to 
ratify the Convention on the Rights to Persons With Disabilities. Compared 
with other countries, the United States has failed to protect women seeking 
asylum based on the claims of domestic violence.24 The United States has 
not signed the Rome Treaty which has recognized that sexual violence may 
constitute a war crime or a crime against humanity. It thus becomes 
impossible to reconcile U.S. claims that it possesses “expertise and capacity 
to prevent and respond to gender-based violence globally” with U.S. 
actions. 
Well-meaning observers may be loath to criticize programs designed to 
provide relief to women as victims. But U.S. foreign policy endeavors in the 
name of saving women and I-VAWA’s problematic provisions cannot but 
raise concerns about well-intended efforts and the inclination to support 
them. U.S. national interests are often incompatible with prevention of the 
harms the United States professes to remedy. Foreign assistance programs 
such as I-VAWA often obscure structural problems and frequently ignore 
the fact that violence against women may be exacerbated by market 
economies and prototypical criminal justice responses. 
There are alternative models of global efforts to address violence 
against women. Multilateral approaches, for example, allow for greater 
opportunity to adopt and adapt best practices from around the world at 
                                                
23 See generally Benedetta Faedi Duramy, Judicial Developments in the Application of 
International Law to Domestic Violence, 21 AM. U. J. GENDER SOC. POL’Y & L. 413 
(2012). 
24 See Karen Musalo, Revisiting Social Group and Nexus in Gender Asylum Claims: A 
Unifying Rationale for Evolving Jurisprudence, 52 DEPAUL L. REV. 777 (2003). 
 CUNY LAW REVIEW FOOTNOTE FORUM [Vol. 18: 37 42 
large. Transnational networks also provide a means for global democratic 
participation in the development of remedies for victims of violence.25 
International efforts and transborder networks are more likely to create 
socio-culturally relevant practices through which to end violence against 
women. 
 
* * * 
 
                                                
25 Nancy Fraser, Reframing Justice in a Globalized World, 36 NEW LEFT REVIEW 69, 
70–87 (2005). The Encuentros in Latin America provide an example of feminist trans-
border organizing and participatory framing. See Sonia Alvarez et al., Encountering Latin 
American and Caribbean Feminisms, 28 SIGNS 537, 538 (2003). 
